ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

or was not such a crime as forgery known to the criminal law. It
was only material for him to show that the altered paper was
fraudulently used by the defendants as a means to obtain from him
a change in the contract. Whether the alteration had been innocently or feloniously made, was of no direct importance. The
material question in issue was this: Did the defendants fraudulently obtain from the plaintiff the modification of the contract as
subsequently agreed to by him?
This case comes within the principle decided in the case of Strader v. Mulvane et al., 17 Ohio St. 624. There was no error in
the refusal to charge, or the charge as given by the .ourt of Common Pleas.
Motion overruled.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNI.ED STATES.'
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.2
SUPREME COURT COMMISSION OF OHIO.3
ADiIRALTY.

See Collision.

Cross-libel.-Where, in a suit in admiralty, a cross-libel and answer
have been filed and a decree entered dismissing the cross-libel, such a
decree, if not appealed from, is conclusive that the libellant in the crosssiit is not entitled to recover affirmative damages for any injuries received by his own vessel, but it does not preclude him from showing in
the original suit, if he can, that a collision was the result of inevitable
accident, or that it was occasioned by the -negligence of those in charge
of the other vessel, or that it was a case of mutual fault, where the
damages should be divided: Pitts, Executor, &e., v. River & Lake
Shore Steamboat Line, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
AGENT.

Notice to, or knowledge by, an agent or a sub-agent is notice to, or
knowledge by, the principal, but to make it so the notice or knowledge
must come in the course of the principal's business, or from a prior transaction then present to the agent's mind, and which could be properly
communicated to the principal: Hoover v. Wise, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1875.
But notice or knowledge on the part of an agent of an intermediate
employer will not affect the principal : Id.
W., residing in New York and having a claim against a debtor in NeI
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braska, put it in the bands of a collection agency, who sent it to an
attorney in Nebraska. This attorney, with knowledge of the debtor's
insolvency, accepted a confession of judgment from him, collected the
money and remitted it to the collection agency. The debtor being adjudicated a bankrupt within four months, his assignee brought suit against
W. to recover back the money. Ield (three judges dissenting), that
the attorney was not the agent of W., and the former's knowledge was
not chargeable to the latter : M.
Whether a different result would have been reached if the money l.a ,
been paid over to W., not decided: Rd.
-BANKERS.

See Broker.

BANKRUPTCY.

Effect of an Adjudicatiom of Bankruptcyy it on a Suit for the Foreclosure of a Mfortgage:-Where a suit to foreclose a mortgage was instituted in a state court, which proceeded to a decree and sale, and the
plaintiffs became the purchasers, receiving the master's deed for the
premises, which was duly confirmed by the court, and pending these
proceedings the mortgagor was adjudicated a bankrupt and an assignee
appointed, but not made a party to the suit oni the mortgage. Hehl,
that there was no provision in the Bankrupt Act which would prevent
the court from proceeding with the case or which would affect the title
of the purchaser under the decree : Eyster v. Gaff et al., S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1875.
The debtor of a bankrupt, or one who contests with him the right to
real or personal property, loses none of his rights by the bankruptcy of
his adversary. The same courts still remain open to him, and in the
classes of cases where the Bankrupt Act has conferred a jurisdiction on
the federal courts for the benefit of the assignee, it is concurrent with,
and does not divest that of the state courts : Id.
BaOKER.
Taxation of Bankers and Brokers.-Plaintiffs were bankers and
paid their tax as such. They also bought and sold gold and stocks for
others, and on their own account. The collector of internal revenue
assessed an additional tax upon them, as brokers, for all their sales of
this kind, as well those ou their own account as those for others.
Held, that the assessment was proper: Warren v. Shook, S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1875.
COLLISION. See Admiralty.
Duty of Vessels under Stcarn.-Two ships under steam, if they are
meeting end on, or nearly end on, so as to involve risk of collision, are
required to put their helms to port, so that each may pass on the port
side of the other, but if they neglect to comply with that requirement
until it is so late that the object to be accomplished cannot be effected,
it is no defence to allege or prove that one or both ported their helms
before the collision occurred, for unless a party seasonably complies
with the requirement, the act .of compliance is without substantial
merit: Ferryboat, &c., v. Railroad Transportation Co., S. 0. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1875.
Sailing rules were ordained to prevent collisions between ships cm-
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ployed in navigation, and to preserve life and property embarked in
that perilous pursuit, and not to enable those whose duty it is to adopt,
if possible, the necessary precautions to avaid such a disaster, to determine bow little they can do in that direction without becoming responsible for its consequences in case it occurs : Id.
The rule, that where both vessels are in fault the damages should be
divided between them, ought not to be extended so far as to inflict positive loss on innocent parties Coastwise Co. v. De las Casas; De las
Casas v. Steamer Alabama et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
Effect of Maritime Usag.-Usages called sea laws, having the effect
of obligatory regulations, to prevent collisions between ships engaged in
navigation, existed long before there was any legislatiofi upon the subject, either in this country or in the country from which our judicial
system was largely borrowed: Steamship City of Washington, &c., v.
Baillie et al, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
Sailing rules and other regulations have since been enacted, and it is
everywhere admitted that such rules and regulations, in cases where they
apply, furnish the paramount rule of decision ; but it is well known that
questions often arise in such litigations outside of the scope and operation of the legislative enactments. Safe guides in such cases are often
found in the decisions of the courts, .or in. the views of standard textwriters, but it is competent for the court in such a case to admit evidence of usage, and if it be proved that the matter is regulated by a
general usage, such evidence may furnish a safe guide as the proper rule
of decision : Id.
Mast-head lights should be displayed by pilot vessels. Lights of the
kind are required as one of many precautions which prudent navigators
are expected to provide, but it would be unreasonable to hold that the
owners of a pilot vessel should be adjudged liable for the consequences
of a collision by reason of not having a mlasthead light, where it appeared beyond all doubt that she constantly showed flash-lights, which
were seasonably seen by the other vessel, and that the absence of the
mast-head light had nothing to do with the collision : Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.

Power of Congress to'.protect Constitutional Rights.-Rights and
immunities created by or dependent upon the Constitution of the United
States, can be protected by Congress. The form and the manner of the
protection may be such as Congress, in the legitimate exercise of its
egislative discretion, shall provide. These may be varied to meet the
necessities of the particular right to be :protected: United States v.
Reese et al., S. C. U. S, Oct. Term 1875.
If Congress has not declared an act done within a state to be a crime
against the United States, the courts have no power to treat it as such:
Id.
The fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States has
invested the cititens with a new'constitutional right which is within the
protecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise, on account of race, color
or previous condition of servitude: Id.
The Act of May 31st 1870, cnmmonly called the Enforcement Act, is
not in pursuance of this amendment, and Cor g 'ess has not as yet pro-
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vided by appropriate legislation for the punishment of a violation of the
provisions of this amendment. CLIFFORD and HUNT, JJ.,dissenting: Id.
Power !f Congress over 1?Jght to petition for R edress of Grievances.
-The
first aumndment of the Constitution prohibits Conress from
abridging "the rights of the people to assemble and to petition the
government fir a redress of grievances." This, like the other amendments proposed and adopted at the same time, was not intended to limit
the powers of the state governments in respect to their own citizens, but
.to operate upon the national government alone : United Stat,,s v. Cruikshank "t al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1875; affirming U. S. v. Cruilcshank,
13 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 6:30.
The particular amendment now under consideration' assumes the
existence of the right of the people to assemble for lawful purposes, and
protects it against encroachment by Congress. The right was not created
by the amendment; neither was its continuance guaranteed, except as
against Congressional interference. For their protection in its enjoyment, therefore, the people must look to the states. There is where the
power for that purpose was originally placed, and it has never been
surrendered to the United States: Id.
It is no more the duty or within the power of the United States to
punish for a conspiracy to filsely imprison or murder within a state than
it would be to punish for false imprisonment or murder itself. CLIFFORD, J., dissenting: M.

Duec Process of Law.-A statute of Louisiana prescribed that a commission should be pribnl facie proof of right to judicial office, and if
any incumbent refused to vacate and turn over the office to the person
bearing such commissiofi, he should be cited by rule returnable within
twenty-four hours to present his claim for adjudication before a court,
which should hear the case without a jury, and its determination should
be final unless appealed from within one day. The appeal if taken was
to be returnable to the Supreme Court within two days, and to have precedence over all other business. Ield, that a competent tribunal and
mode of proceeding T7ere provided, which, though speedy, were " due
process of law :" Ken nard v. State of Louisiana, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1875.
Interference with T'csted Estates- Changing Fee-tail to Fee-simple by
Statute.-In the Act of' December 17th 18 11, "'to restrict the entailment
of estates" (S. & C. 550), the clause which provides "that all estates
given in tail shall be and remain an absolute estate in fee-simple to the
issue of the first donee in tail," was intended to limit entailnents then
subsisting, as well as those which might be thereafter created, and the
enactment, thus construed, was not a prejudicial interference with vested
rights, nor beyond legitimate legislative power: Pollock et al. v. Speidel,
27 Ohio St.
Therefore, where an estate in tail was created by deed, in 1807, and
the issue of the first donee in tail sold and conveyed the premises in feesimple, in 1836, by deed with covenants of general warranty, both he
and his heirs were thereby for ever estopped to claim title to the premises against the grantee of sftch issue or his assigns : Id.
Multiplicity of Suits-Jurlsdictionof Federal Courts to enjoin Proceedings in State Courts.-Celia Groves, of Madison, La., by her wi'l

552

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

devised a plantation to plaintiffs, and appointed Carpenter her executor and general devisee. Plaintiffs filed a bill within a few months
after death of testatrix, against Carpenter, alleging incompetency and
waste of the estate, and also against ono Dennis, who had sued Carpenter
in the state court, claiming to have been a partner of testatrix; against
one Stout and others who claimed to be testatrix's heirs and had sued
in the state court to set aside the devise to plaintiffs as void; and against
Groves and others, heirs of testatrix's former husband, who had sued
in the state court, claiming that the property never belonged to testatrix,
but to her husband. Held, that the bill was bad on demurrer, first,
because there was no such multiplicity of suits as would justify the interference of chancery, the suits recited being by separate parties and
for separate and distinct causes of action; an second, because the principal relief sought was an injunction against proceedings in a state court,
a thing the federal courts are expressly forbidden to do: Raines et aL,
Trustees of Vicksbur Baptitt Church, v. Carpenteret al., S. C. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1875.
CONTRACT.

Construction of Contract-Conditional$ubscription to Stock.-The
Odorless Rubber Co. being embarrassed, passed a resolution that whereas
its stock was impaired to the extent of 30 per cent.. therefore, that stock
to the amount of $72,000 (being 30 per cent. of the capital) should be
called in and cancelled, and new subscription obtained for new stock.
After. the passage of this resolution, deendant signed a subscription
paper for new stock, which after setting forth the number of shares subscribed for, terms of payment, &c., contained this provision, , it being
understood that none of said subscriptions shall be obligatory until at
least the *amount of $118,000 of stock shall Lave been subscribed, and

that 30 per cent. deduction is made on the old stock of this company,
as per vote of stockholders June 10th 1872:" Held, that the reduction
of 30 per cent. was a condition of the subscription and not a mere repre,
sentation of a state of facts supposed to exist at the time: Baker et al
Assignees of Odorless Rubber Co., v. White, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
CORPORATION.

See Contract; Stock.

Liability of Stockholder to Assessment$.-The transferee of stock on
which only a part of its nominal value has been paid, is liable to calls
for the unpaid portion made during his ownership without any proof of
an express promise by him to pay: Webster v. Upton, Assignee, S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
And although his certificate issued by the company was marked
"non-assessable," this is no defence to an action by an assignee of the
company after it has become insolvent. As against creditors, the company has no power to release or contract against the payment of such
calls : .d.
Estoppel to deny Corporate Existence.-A stockholder of a banking
corporation whidh is a corporation de facto, who participates in its transactions and receives dividends, will. by such acts, be estopped to insist
when sued by its creditors that the corporation was not legal. Whether
the bank has been regularly organized or not, is not a defence that can
be avaiiled of by a stockholder as against a bond fide creditor, if it
appears there was a corporation defacto : WMeelock v. Kost, 77 Ill.
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Dealing witA Directors.-A director or stockholder of a private corporation may traide with, borrow from or lend noney to the company bf
which he is a member, ou'the same terms and in like manner as other
per.sns ; but wlicre- a director lends money to his corporation taking a
deed of trust to secure the same, he must act fairly, and be free from
all fraud and oppression ; and where that is the case, the security may
be enforced the same as if given in favor of any other person: Harts
v. Brown, 77 111.
See Constitutional Law.
Performance-Time-Wherea builder has done a large and valuable
part of the work, but yet has failed to complete the whole or any specific
part of the building or structure within the time limited by his covenant, the other party has the option when that time arrives of abandoning the contract for such failure, or of permitting the party in default
to go on, and if. he does the latter, either expressly or by standing by
while the other goes on, he cannot afterwards set up the breach as a
COVENANT.

defence to an action for the contract price: Construction Co. v. Sy-

mour et al., S. (. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
For the injury done by the failure to perform in the stipulated time,
he may recover in a suit on the contract, or he may recoup, in an action
on the contract against him, for the price: Id.
In an action of covenant founded solely on a specialty, evidence of a
parol promise is inadmissible : d.
DAM1AGES.

See Waters, &c.

Exenzla;7- Gross Nregligence-Railroad.-It is settled that there

may be exemplary or punitive damages in tort, but only where the injury is the result of wilful misconduct, or that entire want of care which
would raise a presumption of conscious indifference to consequences:
MAfilwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Arms, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term

1875.
The mere fact of a collision between two railroad trains, not moving
with extraordinary speed and not producing a general destruction of
either train, while it is evidence of negligence for the recovery of compensatory damages by a person injured, will not support a verdict for
exemplary damages: Id.
EQUITY.
Practice under Code-Rit to Jr,.-In
a civil action, where thefacts stated in the petition, and the nature of the relief primarily demanded, are within the sole jurisdiction of a court of equity, neither
party can, of right, demand that the issue of fact made by the pleadings
touching the plaintiff's right to such relief, shall be tried by a jury;
and, therefore, after final judgment, adverse to the plaintiff, in the Court
of Common Pleas, he may appeal such a case to the District Court: Rowland v. Entrekin et al, 27 Ohio St.

And this right of appeal is not affected by the fact that the plaintiff
also demands a money judgment, by way of damages to which he may
incidentally be entitled, as a result of his obtaining the equitable relief
sought : Id.
Aiding a Fraud.-Plaintiff having a balance of $19,000 in bank on
VOL. XXI V-.70
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the day before property was to be listed for state taxation, drew it out
in United States notes, placed them in a package and deposited them in
the vault of the bank. A few days after the listing, he took out the
package and redeposited the notes to his credit. In his return of taxable property he made no mention of these notes, but the asessors added
the amount of them to his return, whereupon he filed a bill to restrain
the collection of the tax on this amount, on the ground that being in
United States notes it was not taxable for state purposes. The Supreme
Court of Kansas dismissed the bill on the ground that the plaintiff's
action was a fraud on the state which a court of equity would not assist.
(See the opinion in full, 11 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 626.) Held, that the
decision was correct: .Mitchell v. Commissioners of Leavenworth, S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
ERROR.

See Practice; Writ of Error.

Practice-Allowing Bill of Exeeptions after Term.-A case was submitted to the court without a jury, and the judge made a general finding
for the plaintiff; a motion by defendant foi a new trial was continued
till the next term, when it was overruled and judgment entered for plaintiff. A writ of error was then taken out, and at the next term a bill
of exceptions was sealed for defendant without any extension of time
being asked or allowed, and without any consent being asked or given by
plaintiff; the bill, however, was regular in form and showed that the exceptions were taken at the trial. Held, that the bill was a nullity. In
United States v. Breitling, 20 How. 253, a bill was sealed after the term,
but under circumstances from which con.ent of the opposing counsel
might be presumed. Under ordinary circumstances the power of a judge
to seal or allow a bill of exceptions ends with the term at which the trial
is had, unless there is an express order of the court extending the time
or the opposite party consents : .Muller et al. v. Ehlers, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1875.
Practice-Final.ulgr ent.-An order of the circuit court reversing
a judgment of the district court, where the case shows that the order if
formally and fully drawn up would only be to set aside a verdict and
judgment, and award a new trial for misdirection on the law, is not a
final judgment on which a writ of error will lie: Baker et al.v. White,
.S.C. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
Practice-Powerof reviewing Court over the Record-New TrialA reviewing court on error has no control of the records of the court below, and cannot, therefore, make any correction or change therein, but
such corrections or changes *must be sought in the court where the
record is made : Smith et al. v. Board of Education,27 Ohio St.
. A reviewing court may, however, disregard any. matter purporting to
be part of the record, which is not legitimately and properly matter of
record: Id.
'What shall constitute the record of a case, is regulated by statute, and
any paper the 'statute authoriies to become part of the record may
that
be made part thereof, without an express order of the court to
I
effect: Id.
When a motion for a new trial is granted by the court in which it is
made, the judgment rendered on the new trial will not be reversed for
error in allowing such new trial: Id.
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ESTATE

TAn.

See Constitutional Law.

EVIMENCE. See .Aflicious Prosecution.
Parol Tcstimony to Reform written Instrument-Alistal.'e.-Clearand
convincing proof is required to warrant the reformation of a written instrument on the ground of mistake, and when it clearly appears that
*thisrule has been disregarded in reforming an instrument, and the finding of the court call be sustained only upon the supposition that it regarded the law as rcquiring nothing more than a mere preponderance of
evidence to warrant a finding sustaining the alleged mistake, a reviewing
court, on error, may reverse the judgment based on such finding: Potter
v. Potter's Executrix. 27 Ohio St.
Order of Receiving.-Where evidence was offered by the plaintiffs,
tending to show statements and admissions, purporting to have been
made by A. in relation to the employment of the plaintiffs by the defendants, as architects, it was competent for the court to admit such evidenee,
subject to the condition that the plaintiffs should subsequently prove
that A.,who made the declarations, was the agent of the defendants:
Di~e Pi"rst Unitarian Society V. Faulkner et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1875.
Where no such evidence was afterwards introduced by the plaintiffs,
but the bill of exceptions of the defendants showed that tile attention
of the court was not again called to the subject, it was not competent
for the defendants to remain silent and suffer an error to be committed
by the court, in order that they might have a valid exception, if the
verdict was in favor of the plaintiffs : .Rl.
INSURANCE.

Compliance with condition of Poliey.-The insured had bought the
goods insured of one F. They were left in the store of I-I. & Co.,
auctioneers, at the time of the purehase, and were left there for sale by
and under the direction of V., the purchaser. It was agreed by him
that the first proceeds of the sale should be paid to the vendor, to the
amount of $3150. and if the auctioneers advanced money upon the stock
they were authorized to retain the possession and control of the goods
as their security. There was no evidence, however, or claim that any
such advance was made. In a suit on the policy, defence was made on
the ground of a violation of that condition of the policy which provides,
that "if the interest of the assured in the property is not absolute, it
must be so expressed in the policy, otherwise the insurance shall be
void," and of a mis-statement in answering that there was no encumbrance
on the property insured, Ileld, that the interest of the insured was
absolute, and that he was entitled to recover : FireAns. Co. v. taughan,
S. C. U. S, Oct. Term 1875.
aOoer-valuation.-An over-valuation of property by the insured, with
a view and purpose of obtaining insurance thereon for a greater sum
than could otherwise be obtained, is a fraud upon the insurance company
that avoids the policy: Id.
It is a question, however, of good faith and honest intention on the
part of the insured, and though lie may have put a value on his property
greatly in excess of its cash value in the market, yet if be did so in the
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honest belief that the property was worth the valuation put upon it,
and the excessive valuation was made in goodl faith, and not intended to
mislead or defraud the insurance company, then such over-valuation is
not a fraudulent over-valuation that will defeat a recovery: Id.
INTERNAL REVENUE.

See Broker.

JURISDICTION. See Bankruptcy; ConstitutionalLaw.
Supreme Court of the United States.-Where the question before the
Supreme Court of the United States is the effect, under the general public law, of a state of sectional civil war upon a contract oflife insurance,
the court has no jurisdiction, as no federal question is presented for determination: f2he New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1875.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Landlord's Lien.-A purchaser of grain raised by a tenant, upon
which the landlord has a lien for rent, with knowledge of that fact and
that the rent is "not fully paid, will be liable to the landlord for the rent
due, to the extent of the value of the grain purchased by him: .Prettyman v. Unland, 77 Ill.
MALI&OUS PROSECUTION.
Evidence--Change of Law-Retroactive Statute.-In an action for
malicious proseeption founded on a criminal proceeding before a magistrate, and when the issue involves malice and probable cause, it must be
tried by direct hud competent evidence to the jury. And it is error on
such issue to permit witnesses to rehearse the testimony given before the
magistrate by witnesses other than the defendants : John v. Bridgman
27 Ohio St.
and ife,
- Btit it is competent to prove by any competent witness who was present, and heard the testimony, that no evidence in support of the criminal
charge was offered or given by the defendant. Richards v. Foulke, 3
Ohio 52, distinguished and followed: Id.
In such trial the record of the magistrate is competent evidence, at
least to show the facts of the acqiittal and discharge of the plaintiffs:
Id.
When at the time the action was brought, a witness would have been.
incompetent, but" an amendatory law in force at the time of the trial
makes him competent, the law in force at the time of the trial governs
the question. The unpublished case, 25 Ohio -St. 500, decides this.
Nor in such law so applied liable to the objection of being retroactive
within the prohibition of the Constitution of 1851 : Id.

MANDAMUS.

See Municpal Bonds.

MARRIED WOMAN.

Separate Estate-Land bought and improved by Wife with Money
acquiredbefore Marriageand with separate Earnings-Acuiescenceof
Husband.-A., a married woman, purchas ed land with money which
had been given to her previously to her marriage by her father. The
buildings erected thereon were constructed 'partly with such money and
partly with her subsequent earnings. At the time of her marriage, the
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common law governed in the District of Columbia, where she lived, as
to the rights of married women to the personal property possessed by
them previously to their marriage, and as to their subsequent earnings.
By that law the money which the wife then possessed and her subsequent earnings bclonge1 exclusively to her husband. A.'s husband having acquiesced for fit'tcen years in her holding the land in her own name
and in making improvements thereon with her earnings : field, that in
a controvrsy between the parties after a divorce, this was evidence of
his original authorization of thi investments, constituting a voluntary
settlement upon his wife, and that therefore the property belonged to A.:
Jackson v. Jackson, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

.regligence-Liahility of fasterfor.-Where a brakeman of a railway
company is injured while in the service of the company, in consequence
of a defective ladder, which giving way, caused him to fall, the company
will not be liable to such servant, unless it had notice of the defect, or
might have had such knowledge by the exercise of a proper degree of
diligence and care: Toledo, lWabash & lWestern Railway (o. v. Ingraham, 77 Ill.
MISTAKE.
See Evidezce.
MORTGAGE. See Bankriptcy.
MUNICIPAL BONDS,
Regzdarity of Proceedingscannot le inq'iredinto against a bon(afide
holer-iYandamnus.-Where specific power is given by the legislature
authorizing a board of education to issue negotiable bonds for school
purposes upon certain conditions prescribed, the regularity of the' proceedings of the board cannot be disputed, where the bonds, upon their
thee, purport to have been issued under the law in question, and where
they have been sold by the board and afterward passed into the hands
of a bona fide holder : The State ex rel. Robertson v. Board of Education, 27 Ohio St.
Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the board to appropriate
moneys already in their treasury for that purpose, towards the payment
of such bonds, and to levy such tax as may be necessary to complete
such payment: Id.
MUNICIrAL

CORPORATION.

Municial Subscrilptions and .Bonds.-If the people of a county vote
a subscription in aid of a railway company to be paid in bonds of the
county upon certain conditions precedent, the county authorities cannot
delegate power to others to determine when the conditions are performed, but must determine that fact themselves, as the authorized
agents of the people. This is an official trust, which cannot be delegated : S ervisors of Jackcson County v. Brush, 77 Il1.
License of Vrehicles.-A provision in a city charter gave the power
to license, tax and regulate and control wagons and other vehicles conveying loads in the- city; to prescribe the width and tire of the same,
the weight of loads to be carried and the rates of carriages." field,
not to apply to the case of wagons used by the defendant in the regular
course of his business as a merchant, but only extends to wagons of
common carriers for hire: Joyce v. East St. Loziis, 77 Ill.
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NATIONAL BANKS.

Who liable as Stocholet)rs.-IPrinarily, a creditor of a national
bank may proceed against the party in whom the legal title to the
stock is vested. Where shares of stuck in a banking corporation have
been hypothecated, and placed in the hands of the transferee, hp
will be subjected to all the liabilities of ordinary owners; for the reason
that the property is in his name, and the legal ownership appears to
be in him : Wheelock v. Eost, 77 Ill.

NEoLIGENCE.

See Master and Servant.

NOTICE.

See Agent.

OFFICER.
.Payment for Services.-A person accepting a public office with
a fixed salary is bound to perform the duties of the office for the
salary. He cannot legally claim additional compensation for the discharge of those duties, even though subsequently imposed by statute or
ordinance. And a pronse to pay an officer an extra sum beyond that
fixed by law, is not binding, though he renders services and exercises a
degree of diligence greater than could legally have been required o.f
him : City of Decaturv. ernillion, 77 Ill.
PRACTICE. Sc.e Error.
Assignments of 1irror.-Thc object of the rule requiring an assignment
of errors is to enable the court -and opposing counsel LU see on what
poitits a reversal of judgment is to be asked, and to limit the discussion
to such points. The practice of unlimited assignments -covering the
whole case and compelling the court to sift out for itself the points
really relied on, is u perversion of the rule, and the court will only notice
such as seem fa it material: MUldl)s (onstruction 42o. v. Seymour et al.,
S.C. U. S., Oct. Tera 1875.

PUBLIC USE.
Dedietdion to.-Wlhere tie plat of a village showed a square, not

divided into lots as the other blocks, with no designation of its use, and
the proof showed the sale of lots around the same at an enhanced price,
nnd an intention to dedicate the square to public use, and a long acquiescence in the use of the same as a public park, this was hed, to be a
dedication a common law to the public use : Village of PTincevil v.
Auten, 77 Ill.
RECORD. See Error.
SALE.

When Delivery to pass Title.-To affect subsequent purchasers
without notice, and creditors, there must be an actual delivery of personal
property, to consummate a sale; but the rule has its exceptions, in the
cahe'of warehouse receipts : as'where a warehouseman purchased grain
stored by him, for another person, and with such other person's money,
and took up his outstanding receipt, held by the vendor, and issued a
new receipt to the person for whom he bought, it wa held that the
grain was not liable thereafter to lie taken in execution against the warehouseman : Broadwell v. Ifoward, 77 Ills.
SET-OFF.

When allowed-Debts owicng by and to an insolvent Corporation.The debts which may be set-off against each other must be in the same
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rigbt, and tlii: rule is the same at law and in equity: Scammon v.
.in,bll, .Assqncec (?f Mntual Security Insurance Co., S. 0.U. S., Oct.
Term 18i75.
Whiere an insurance company which has become insolvent has money
on dcposit with a banker, the latter may set-off againist tle 'company's
assignee in bankruptey; his claims under policies of the company for
losses (in properties destroyed by fire : .Id.
B ut lie cannot set-off his claims under such policies against his notes
for subscriptions to stock of the company. The stock and money due
from its sale constitute assets in trust for payment of the company's
debts, and the rights of creditors are superior to those of a stockholder,
although the latter be also a creditor: P.
In the ordinary course of business, funds deposited with a banker
become his property and constitute an ordinary debt payable on demand
in instalments at the depositor's option, and the subject of set-off, but
semrlle ifthey were deposited with him as treasurer of a corporation the
funds would be held upon a trust and not subject to set-off: -d.
SHERIFP'S SALE.
Groundsfor seting asid.-Where a plaintiff in execution, through
his attorneys, bids in a tract of land turned out by the defendant in the
execution, iusatisietion of the execution, in consequence of the misrepresentations of the sheriff inaking the levy and sale, that the same
was not encumbered, when, in fact, it was encumbered in excess of its
value, this will afford no ground for setting aside the sale and satisfaction,
as the sheriff is not the agent of the defendant: Vanscoyoc v. Minler,
77 11.
STOCK. See Contract; Corporations.

ULnpit-L;I*bilty of Owner.-Unpaid stock is as much a part of
the assets of an insurance company as the cash which has been paid in
upon it. Creditors have the same right to look to it as to anything else,
and the same right to insist upon its payment as upon the payment of
any other debt.due to the company. As regards creditors there is no
distinction between such a demand and any other asset which may form
a part of the property and effects of the corporation : Sanger v. Upton,
Assignee, &c.; Ujlton, Assigne' v. Tribilcock, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1875.
A fraudulent representation by an agent of the corporation at the time
he obtained a subscription to the stock, that only 20 per cent. of the par
value was assessable, is no defence to an action by the corporation or its
assignee in bankruptcy for the unpaid instalments. A party has no
right to rely on a representation that is contrary to law : Id.
TRUSTEE.

Compensation of.-At common law, in the absence of contract, a
trustee is entitled to no compensation for the management of the trust
property. He may impose terms as the condition of his acceptance
of the trust, and the person creating the trust may accede to the same
or not as he chooses. Where the trust is accepted without agreement
as to compensation, the trustee may charge for all reasonable and proper
expenses incurred in earing for and preserving the trust property or
fund: .thuggins v. Rider, 77 Ills.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
WAR.

Effect of Ronorable Discharye-ileaningof" Allowances."-An honorable discharge of a soldier from service does not restore to him pay
and allowances forfeited for desertion: tinitecl States v. Landers, S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
Under the termI "allowances" bounty is included: i.
Effect of a state of War qpon Gommercial Intercourse.--As a general
rule one of the immediate consequences of a declaration of war and the
effect of a state of war, even when not declared, is that all commercial
intercourse and dealing between the subjects or adherents of the con. tending powers is unlawful, and is interdicted. In the United States,
however, licences to carry on trade, especially in the case of a civil war
which is sectional, may be issued under the authority of an Act of Congress, and in special cases for purposes immediately connected with the
prosecution of the war, they may be granted by the authority of the
President, as commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of the
United States: Matthews v. .cStea, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.
Both the Act of Congress of July 13th 1861, and the proclamation
of the President of August 16th 1861, exhibit a clear implication that
before the first was enacted, and the second was issued, commercial intercourse was not unlawful, and that is had been permitted : M.
Where a bill of exchange, dated April 23d 1861, and made payable
in one year, was drawn on a firm in New Orleans and accepted by them
on the day of its date, and A., one of the defendants, and a member of
the firm, was a resident of the State of New York, it was held, that the
partnership was not dissolved by the war of the rebellion prior to April
23d 1861, and that therefore A. was liable : Id.
WARRANTY. See Constitutional Law.
WATERS AND WATER-COURSES.

Municipal Cbrooration-Damages.-Ifa city in fixing the grade of a
street, or in afterwards changing it, causes water to flow upon a lot that
it did not naturally flow upon, the city will be held liable therefor:
City of Bloomington v. Brokaw, 77 Ills.
WRIT OF ERROR.

From the Supreme Court of the United States to a State Court- To
what Court directed- Transmission of Record.-If the highest court of
a state has, after judgment, sent its record and judgment in accordance
with the law of the state to an inferior court for safe keeping, and no
longer has them in its own possession, the Supreme Court of the United
States may send its writ either to the highest court or to the inferior
court. If the highest court can and will, in obedience to the requirement of the writ, procure a return of the record and judgment from the
inferior court, and send them up, no writ need go to the inferior court.
But if it fails to do this, the Supreme Court of the United States may
send direct to thp court having the record in its custody and under its
control: Atherton et al. v. Fowler et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1875.

